

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAMES MILLER,

Plaintiff,

-against-

L. KORTRIGHT; L. LILLY; G. JERGJI,

Defendants.

1:24-CV-2002 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff James Miller, who is currently incarcerated in the Adirondack Correctional Facility, located in Ray Brook, Essex County, New York, filed this *pro se* action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.<sup>1</sup> He sues: (1) L. Lilly, whom he alleges is the Superintendent of the Eastern Correctional Facility (“Eastern C.F.”); (2) L. Kortright, whom he alleges is a Hearing Officer assigned to the Eastern C.F.; and (3) G. Gergji, whom he alleges is the Principal of the school at the Eastern C.F. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York.

**DISCUSSION**

The relevant venue provision for Plaintiff’s action can be found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that a federal civil action may, unless otherwise provided by law, be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

---

<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff commenced this action using an amended Section 1983 complaint form. (ECF 1.)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff does not allege where any of the defendants reside, so it is unclear whether this court is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1). He does allege, however, that the events that are the bases for his claims occurred at the Eastern C.F. (ECF 1, at 2), which is located in Napanoch, Ulster County, New York, in the Northern District of New York, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 112(a). Thus, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a civil action is filed in a federal district court where venue is proper, that court may transfer that action to any other federal district court where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors).

Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate for this action. The underlying events allegedly occurred at the Eastern C.F., the defendants are alleged to be assigned to that facility, and it is reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would also be located there, in the Northern District of New York. Thus, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to that court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); *D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener*, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”).

### **CONCLUSION**

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. Summonses shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this court.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. *Cf. Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2024  
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

---

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN  
Chief United States District Judge